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Introduction
Although there is a certain degree of incompatibility between the
Western-derived rhetoric relating to politicisation and Bhutanese
practice, since the former may be irrelevant to the latter, challenges
resulting from the politicisation process in Bhutan can be compared to
what happened in all developing societies. As all traditional states,
Bhutan has gone through two different stages in the modernisation of
its polity. From the establishment of the monarchy in 1907 to the
1960's, the first challenge had been to "concentrate power necessary to
produce changes in a weakly articulated and organised traditional
society and economy". The second stage that consists in expanding
"the power in the system to assimilate the newly mobilised and
politically participant groups, in order to create a modern system"1, is
still underway. Huntington's conclusion that such a process was
necessarily fatal to any monarchical system lacking the western
European political-cultural background has not yet been verified in
Bhutan. On the contrary, the Bhutanese monarchy has been the main
agent of modernisation. Since it opened to the outside world, in the
early 1960s, the kingdom has adopted a unique path toward
development. Promoting a distinctive approach to institutions building
(polity) and governance orientations (policies), which is consistent
both with tradition and modernity, has been essential to its survival.
The present paper is a tentative presentation of the normative
architecture of the current Bhutanese polity. It identifies a hierarchy of
principles and patterns, which have guided simultaneously the
preservation of the traditional system and its adaptation to modern
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constraints. The main challenges are also described in order to assess
the viability of the monarchy as the principal agent of change.
The Basic Principles of Bhutan's Polity
The Bhutanese polity has been influenced by specific historical,
cultural and religious factors. Its general profile can be drawn from
five parameters: cultural identification, national independence, and
tradition of consensus, synthesis capacity, and the role of hereditary
monarchy.
Cultural Identification
Building unity out of diversity has been one of the main threads of
Bhutan's political history. Since its emergence as a single political
entity, during the 17th century, the country had to face various periods
of external aggression and internal strife. The creation of a nation-
state has been dependant upon the definition of a Bhutanese identity
which is closely related with the dominant Drukpa1 culture. The credit
for unifying Bhutan and introducing its first codified laws, known as
Chathrim, goes to Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (1616-1651) who
was instrumental in founding a new country and asserting its religious
and political independence from Tibet. Among other achievements, he
secured the dominant position of the Drukpa Kagyu school that gave
the country its local name - Drukyul: the land of the Drukpa sect - and
forged its religious and cultural history. Common traditions, including
a dress code and distinctive rituals with Bhutanese characteristics,
date back from that period. Dzongkha, the only language with a native
tradition in Bhutan, which became the national language in 1961, was
also decisive in building a sense of solidarity among the people.
Eventually, the unification of Bhutan was completed when the
theocratic rule was replaced by an hereditary monarchy. An oath of
allegiance -Genja- was sworn in 1907 by the most important civil and
monastic officials, along with the people's representatives, who jointly
pledged their support to and appointed Ugyen Wangchuck as first
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king of Bhutan.2 Although there is "no evidence in available sources,
that anything resembling an election was actually used in 1907 in the
events that preceded the recognition of Ugyen Wangchuck as Druk
Gyalpo",3 "the decision to establish monarchy appeared to have been
genuinely popular not only among those responsible for taking it but
also with the public at large".4 This episode was decisive in the nation
building process. It was also a major factor of cultural identification.
As the last Mahayana kingdom, Bhutan has inherited a philosophy of
life which is deep rooted in its religious traditions and institutions.
Basic values like compassion, respect for life and nature, social
harmony, compromise, and prevalence of individual development
over material achievements have had direct impact on policy making.
Achieving a "balance between spiritual and material aspects of life,
between Peljor Gongphel (economic development) and Gakid
(happiness and peace)"5 is both a cultural imperative and a political
objective. Because Bhutan is located between two giant neighbours
that could threaten its independence at any moment, the concept of
survival has become the geopolitical prolongation of its sense of
insecurity. For that reason, cultural identification and the need to
preserve what can be described as the "Bhutanese exception", both in
cultural and political terms, is perceived by the regime as essential to
the viability of the current system, and to the independence of the
kingdom. That explains why the Drukpa culture is still inspiring
current institutions.
National Independence
Despite its strategic location, Bhutan has never been colonised, nor by
the Tibetans who tried to invade it after it became a distinct entity,
neither by the British who imposed their rule over the Indian
subcontinent. Contrary to most developing countries, it entered the
20th century without a complex of inferiority and subservience vis-à-
vis foreigners. From its point of view, national independence has had
three major correlations: the autonomy of the local polity, a strong
sense of national pride, and a culture of isolationism.
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None of the large ideological movements that spread through the third
world after the Second World War affected the kingdom. Bhutan
escaped the concepts of nationalist political movements that led to
India's independence and spread to Nepal and Sikkim. Socialism or
liberalism is irrelevant to the Bhutanese polity, at least in its present
form. Political consciousness has always been very low among the
general populace. The politicisation process that had significant
impact on large sections of the population in all other parts of South
Asia has not mobilised Bhutanese crowds, except for Nepali
Bhutanese in the southern districts. That the average Bhutanese is
only poorly educated and clearly has priorities that lay outside of the
political sphere has been decisive in that respect.
Bhutan has not imported foreign institutions nor political parties, even
during the 1960's when the kingdom was placed under the pressure of
India that played a decisive role in the modernisation process.
Concerns have arisen at that time about the influence of India in the
decision-making process in Bhutan. In the mid-1960's, the role of
Indian officers in the kingdom caused great controversy. Many
Indians officers were in charge of day-to-day operations because the
Bhutanese administration lacked human resources. In 1963 the king
accepted the appointment of an "Indian adviser" to assist him.
However Indian influence on the administrative level never had direct
impact on the polity itself.6
 The prominent position assumed by Dorji
family members until the assassination, in 1964, of the Lonchen, who
was the closest to a prime minister, did not alter the nature of the
system as the king assumed both the role of head of state and head of
the government.
As a result, the Bhutanese people have inherited a strong sense of
national pride. The kingdom has been dependant on external
assistance to finance its modernisation. Yet, foreign donors have
respected its approach to development, so that Bhutanese have the
feeling of being the masters of their own future. Bhutan has always
maintained a low profile on the international scene. Preserving its
sovereignty has been one of the main objectives of its foreign policy.
It has never considered the guidance clause included in the treaty it
signed with India in 1949, as a limitation to its independence. On the
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contrary, it used its special relation with India to gain entry to the
United Nations as a country, which intended to exercise its full, and
sovereignty rights.
Although Bhutan was not a secluded state, as often described,
isolationism has generated a tradition of self-reliance and self-
organisation among local communities that developed their own
regulations, unwritten laws, practices and customs. The sharing of
irrigation water and grazing land, and the use of common labour for
infrastructures and monasteries maintenance are part of that heritage.
Because local communities were confronted with difficult
geographical and climatic conditions, they had to count on their own
capabilities to organise their life. Trade had an important role in
traditional Bhutan. Yet, the country was not organised as a
commercial hub. Its social and political structures were mostly inward
looking. Once settled in their valleys, farmers had few contacts with
the outside world. Therefore "maintaining the sovereignty of the
kingdom through economic self-reliance" has become a national
objective.7
Tradition of Consensus
As noted by Michael Aris, most Bhutanese consider that "violence at
best provides only an interim solution, and at worst merely provokes a
cycle of further conflict".8 In the political tradition of Bhutan, peace
and violence9 represent the two wings of government that are
supposed to be held in a kind of balance in the same way the sacred
and secular spheres (Chhösi) or the samsara and nirvana (Sizhi
khordey) form "unitary dualisms". Because the use of violence has
been channelled by religious practice through tantric rituals, peace has
become a system of government used by the civil administration
known as the "Peaceful" (Zhiwey Zhung yog).10 For that reason the
"tradition of mediation" that emerged under the theocracy, is still
prevalent under the current polity. Confrontation is refused as a
solution to conflicts both at the local and national levels. What can be
described as a "customs of negotiation and contestation"11 has resulted
in the building of a system where consensus is a mode of government.
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The way major institutions operate is consistent with that concept.
The monarchy itself was created on an act of consensus: the consensus
was then to pacify the country and to centralise the power. Later on,
the monarchy was cautious in making modernisation acceptable by all
circles of the society, including local elite families12 and the monk
body. The people were also associated to the modernisation process
through the promotion of a land reform and the use of the Kidu -
welfare- system. The capacity of the monarchy to become the first
agent of conciliation was essential in asserting its legitimacy. The
same reason that makes the king the representative of the whole
people, without distinction of ethnical, religious or political origins,
explains why political parties are not allowed: they are not consistent
with the tradition of consensus. Simultaneously, processes of
negotiation have been invented to allow contestation to be channelled
through concertation procedures. The National Assembly and local
development committees (G Y T s  and DYTs13) fulfil that role.
Discussions in these bodies are often vigorous as shown by the last
sessions of the National Assembly. However, major decisions are
always taken on the base of consensus after long debates.14 The
contest in the national elections -both in the Royal Advisory Council
and in the National Assembly- is more and more vigorous, and
therefore controversial. However, consensus still inspires election
procedures. Even the newly created Council of Ministers (Lhengye
Zhungtshog) is complying with that tradition: "as the ministers are all
new, in order to discuss among themselves and decide by consensus, a
Co-ordination Committee of the Council of Ministers (Lhengye
Nyamdrel Tshogchung) has been established".
Consensus is also transpiring from Bhutanese legal codes. "Formal
litigation is costly and there is a certain stigma attached to it. A
dispute can instead be put to a respected and independent figure for
adjudication, either lay or clerical. Sometimes intermediaries (Jabmi)
will liaise between that person and the parties to the conflict. More
formally, a case can be put to a village headman to negotiate a
compromise settlement outside the court system. Usually a contract is
drawn up and formally signed by the disputants and countersigned by
those who have taken part at the settlement. Therefore the process of
formal litigation in a court of law represents the total failure of the
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community itself to effect a settlement. Even in a court the tendency is
always to reach a settlement by amicable compromise rather than by
decree. District courts have inherited the powers that was formally
vested in the royal secretaries and courtiers who were assigned the
task of resolving dispute by delegation of the king's power".15 As the
final court of appeal with authority to commute sentences and grant
pardon, the king is the keeper of the tradition of consensus.16
Synthesis Capacity
Independence does not mean ostracism towards foreign influence. On
the contrary, Bhutan has shown a capacity to assimilate innovations,
which are not harmful to its traditions, and to transform them into
something consistent with the local system of values, which
eventually become distinctively Bhutanese. This "Bhutanisation"
process, which can be described as a synthesis capacity can be
observed in the strategy of development itself. Coming late to the
development scene, Bhutan was eager to avoid mistakes committed
elsewhere. While strongly dependant on foreign aid and expertise, it
was determined to follow its own set of priorities. As a result,
development has been remarkably free from seeing economic,
political, social, or cultural disruption. Building a well trained but lean
bureaucracy and a modern system of education, both with western
input but according to Bhutanese criteria, was essential in that
process.
The same type of adaptation has taken place in the legal sector. The
reorganisation of the judicial system back in the late 1960's, the
development of the jurisprudence later on, the enactment of decisive
acts, and the recent improvement of the judicial process through the
development of a standardised civil and criminal court procedure
participate to the modernisation of the overall system which has been
enriched by principles of western origin. At the same time, the laws of
Bhutan are locally-grown. It is still the 17th century Zhabdrung's
Chathrim and its Buddhist values that inspire the judiciary. As noted
by the Chief Justice who is very keen in theorising this combination:
"We must draw inspiration from the wisdom of the past. At the same
time, we must face the challenges of changing times".17
 For that
reason the creation of an independat Office of Legal Affairs has been
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proposed in 1999, in order to facilitate the evolution of the justice
system to meet challenges ahead.
Hereditary Monarchy
Bhutan has a very atypical monarchy. Compared to other countries,
the institution is rather recent, at least in its present form. Yet, there is
a cultural continuity with previous systems. Kingdoms were
established in Bhutan long before the country was unified in the 18th
century. Some of the local rulers, especially in the East, made a
decisive contribution to the emergence of the founding myths of
Bhutan.18 The Druk Desis - leaders who, from 1751 to 1907, held
secular powers, at least in theory, in the semi-theocracy system known
as Chhösi - can be compared to kings although their status in the
society was slightly different. In that respect, there is a monarchical
tradition in Bhutan that goes far beyond the institution itself. It
explains why the hereditary monarchy has become the main source of
cohesion and consistency of the current polity.
The Bhutanese monarchy identifies closely with the religious legacy,
on a rather distinctive mode. Contrary to the king of Nepal, who is a
manifestation of Vishnu, the king of Bhutan is a secular monarch who
did not inherit the religious authority of the Zhabdrung. Neither is he
a Chogyäl in the Himalayan tradition. As the ruler of the Drukpa
society, the Druk Gyalpo only inherited the secular powers of the
Druk Desi.19 He does not get his primary legitimacy from his divine
ascendance, although the Wangchuck dynasty has a line of ancestors
that goes back to the Dungkar Chöje of Kurtöe and to the famous saint
Pemalingpa.20 For that reason, he cannot be considered as an absolute
monarch "in either theoretical or legal terms",21 but as a "ruler by
convention" as mentioned in the Buddhist tradition.22 The mode of
enthronement of the dynasty reminds the model of the first king of
Buddhism legend, Mahasammata - Mangpö Kurwai Gyalpo, literally
the King Elevated by Many- whose legitimacy was based on popular
consent.
Although secular, the Bhutanese monarchy uses various religious
symbols.23 The Druk Gyalpo is "'The Precious Master of Power and
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King of Drukyul".24 He is addressed formally by the honorific word
for foot "Zhab" - literally "In Front of the Feet"- a religious term
which was also found in Zhabdrung. He occupies the "golden throne"
and is the only one, apart from the Je Khenpo, to wear the yellow
scarf. Both attributes are usually associated with high Lamas. His
crown carries the head of a raven which is a reference to the religious
history of the country.25 The Driglam Namzha or code of etiquette that
includes all formal behaviours observed not only in the presence of
the king but in all ceremonial occasions, has been influenced by
Buddhist values.26 When enthroned, the king is vested with his formal
powers during a ceremony held in the dzong of Punakha where he
"presents a ceremonial white scarf, symbolising the purity of his
intentions, to a scroll-painting of the protective deity of the realm, in
the presence of the embalmed remains of the founding Zhabdrung. In
return he receives a scarf of office as if from the very hands of the
country's first unifier".27 The Druk Gyalpo is supportive of the dharma
and the sangha. The Mahayana figure of the bodhisattva who refuses
nirvana to alleviate the sufferings of the world is seen by Bhutanese as
applying to their king.28
The king is highly revered by the people. Yet he is very close to it.
His standing is rather simple and palace ceremony is minimal,
although recent trends have introduced more formality.29 He often
tours the country to meet with local communities and organise public
debates. Any one can present grievance to him. His kidu, or welfare,
can always be requested. The "elected" basis of the monarchy and the
re-introduction in 1999 of a mechanism through which the National
Assembly can register a vote of confidence in the king30 enhance that
dimension.
The hereditary monarchy has become the key factor of the "unitary
dualism" which can be described as the main characteristic of the
Bhutanese polity. His legitimacy mainly relies on his capacity to
preserve the balance between tradition and modernity, religion and
secularism on which depends "change in continuity".
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The Impact of these Principles on the Governance System
Institution-building and policy orientations have been deeply
influenced by the above features, as shown by the national ideology
and the decision-making process.
Bhutan's Distinctive Institutions: the Religious Factor
With a few changes and some significant additions, most of the
structures created by the founding Zhabdrung have been surviving
under the present system. The principle of tripartite participation
involving representatives of the people, the administration, and the
community of monks, which is part of consensus politics, is prevalent
among most political bodies in Bhutan. The National Assembly
(Tshogdu) which was created in 1951, consists of three categories of
members: 105 are elected by the people; 35 are nominated as ex-
officio representatives of the government, and 10 are elected by the
clergy. The Royal Advisory Council  (Lodoi Tshogde) has the same
type of structure. It consists of nine members:  six elected
representatives of the people, two elected representatives of the clergy
and one nominee of the government who also serves as the chairman
of the council. It was created in 1965 as part of the "modernisation" of
institutions. Yet, it can be seen as the revival of the old state council
(Lhungye Tsok) that was established during the 17th century by the
Zhabdrung, and lost its relevance after endorsing the setting up of the
monarchy. The cabinet itself (Lhengye Zhungtshog) as per the reform
of 1998 is made up of ministers elected by the National Assembly,
and the members of the Royal Advisory Council. While a small body
inclusive only of elected members would have resembled closely the
cabinet seen in Western parliamentary governments, a larger body is
typical of Bhutanese governance.
Also typical is the role of monks in the polity. "The monastic order
lacked strong leadership during the transitional period" to be capable
of any effective action.31
 The termination of the theocracy might have
generated frustration within the Drukpa monastic establishment,
which has been progressively excluded from a critical role in the
country polity.32 The modus vivendi achieved between the hereditary
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monarchy and the Drukpa monastic establishment proved mutually
satisfactory and non confrontational. The institution of the Je Khenpo
has never been endangered by the hereditary monarchy. While the
Druk Gyalpo still exercises some sort of "indirect authority over the
monastic establishment",33 the Je Khenpo is the undisputed head of
the Dratshang.34 Religion has a "modern" role in contemporary
Bhutan in the sense that monks have lost their political status and
autonomy. They are heavily dependent upon the government for their
financial support. The representatives of the monk body, in the
National Assembly,35 the Royal Advisory Council, and the local
committees are mainly concerned with religious matters. The
monastic establishment made no obstructions to reforms, although
most of them eroded their influence.36 Reportedly, they have even
"supported most of the economic and social reform programs".37
Yet, their political influence should not be undermined, especially
under the present context. Changes affecting the Bhutanese society are
a major preoccupation for the monastic establishment, whose primary
concern is the preservation of cultural identity and religious values.
Conservatism has gained ground during the last decade. The
introduction in 1989 of a code of etiquette echoed an old demand of
the monastic establishment that requested in the early 1970's "civil
officials wear traditional Bhutanese dress while on duty".38 The role
and place of religion are emphasised by public policy as part of
preservation of the cultural heritage. A Council of Ecclesiastic Affairs
(Dratshang Lhentshog), headed by the Je Khenpo, has been created in
1984. Existing religious institutions are being expanded and new ones
established "in fulfilment of the command of the king and the wishes
of the people in order to ensure that the Dharma teachings will
continue to flourish".39 Monks are encouraged to play a greater civic
role. Many efforts have been done to improve their understanding of
development issues, in order to use their influence in the Bhutanese
society to promote health or environment consciousness. The election
in 199640 of a younger Je Khenpo helped the monastic establishment
to become more dynamic. Religious ceremonies of collective blessing
and prayer (Wang-lung-thri) which are conducted all around the
country by the Je Khenpo, in front of thousands of devotees, are the
occasion to exhort the monks to become raw models for the society.
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In order to stop the decline of religious values among the young
generation and to address the current shortage of monks, instruction
have been given to increase their number.41 Ceremonies with a high
degree of symbolism are often the occasion to celebrate the founding
fathers of Bhutan and to proclaim the importance of religious values.42
Eventually, the Dratshang brings its contribution to the modernisation
process by adapting some of its traditional rules as shown by the
recent reform of offerings.43
The Path Toward Modernisation
Although major reforms were introduced soon after the third Druk
Gyalpo's accession to the throne in 1952, it was only during the 1960's
that the modernisation process became comprehensive. During that
period, external factors44, to both the south and north signalled the end
of Bhutan's insulation from disruptive forces and made policy
innovations necessary. The personality of the third Druk Gyalpo was
also decisive. Jigme Dorje Wangchuck was familiar with the
mechanisms of reform in India, and somewhat symphatetic to the
concept of modernisation itself. He was convinced that changes had to
be brought to the kingdom through a guided program of development
that would encompass political, administrative, economic and social
reforms. Those reforms were better adopted under non-crisis
conditions so that the monarchy could keep the lead, control the whole
process, and avoid disruptive effects on traditional system and
national unity that could have resulted from radical changes.
The present king has followed the same path. Contrary to what
happens in most monarchical polities, he has always anticipated the
needs for reform, which are usually claimed by the people. The
absence of a modernising elite other than his immediate entourage and
the low level of political consciousness of the people are largely
responsible for that situation. His decision to devolve full executive
powers to an elected cabinet, and to submit himself to a vote of
confidence give indications about his personal vision: "The time has
now come to promote greater people's participation in the decision
making process. Our country must be ensured to always have a system
of government which enjoys the mandate of the people, provides clean
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and efficient governance, and also has an inbuilt mechanism of checks
and balances to safeguard our national interest and security".45
The timing of the reform might have been influenced by external
pressure regarding the need of a "democratic" evolution in Bhutan.
Yet the king has followed his own pace of modernisation. He has
"observed the political systems of other countries" and does not
exclude further institutional changes.  The mention of "checks and
balances" could be a reference to a parliamentary regime with a
constitutional monarchy that could eventually be adopted in Bhutan.
The implementation of such a system would require further reforms,
including the introduction of party based elections. Because the
current polity "cannot afford to have the divisive forces of
communalism come into play in the election of the Council of
Ministers", this type of reform is not on the official agenda, at least for
the moment. Nevertheless the king has decided to put his own destiny
in the balance through the introduction of a "mechanism for a vote of
confidence in the Druk Gyalpo", as a testimony of his democratic
ambitions.
The National Ideology
Theocratic tradition prevailing before the establishment of the
monarchy provided little ideological support to the new regime other
than religious principles. The ruling elite has never complied with any
dogmatic approach. Pragmatism and a predilection for gradualism has
been its guiding principles. Political rhetoric has been little stultifying.
As already noted, Bhutan does not classify itself in terms of socialist
or liberal policies, although egalitarianism has occasionally appeared
in public statements, including recently at the occasion of the debate
on the introduction of an income tax.46
Yet, ideological considerations can be used to analyse new political
behaviours. After Bhutan opened to the outside world, the official
rhetoric tended to be modernist in content, due to the influence of
foreign patterns, essentially coming from India, and to the
requirements of development. While modernisation is still essential,
the importance of conservatory policies and preservation of national
heritage has been underlined. The two rhetorics have been merged
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under the catchphrase of "Gross National Happiness" (GNH). "Apart
from the obvious objectives of development: to increase GDP on a
national level and incomes at the household level, development in
Bhutan includes the achievement of less quantifiable objectives. These
include ensuring the emotional well-being of the population, the
preservation of Bhutan's cultural heritage and its rich and varied
natural resources.47" The concept of GNH was first introduced by the
king in the late 1980's but the term is "a popularisation of the distinct
Bhutanese perception of the fundamental purpose of development,
which can be traced throughout the period of development".48 It is a
"translation of a cultural and social consciousness into development
priorities", in a country which perceives itself "as a kind of Mandala, a
place where Man can transform their infrastructure, polity and social
organisations to create Gross National Happiness".49
The tendency to describe the concept with reference to the Buddhist
cosmology, is a clear evidence of its ideological content. "We are
facing a genuinely non-western development approach, which
considers non economic goals more important than economic ones".50
Among the main features of that ideology, the importance of
environmental preservation is inherited from Buddhist rhetoric. The
role of welfare state, through a paternalist approach of political
organisation is a prolongation of the feudal organisation that was
prevailing in traditional self-sufficient local communities. This
ideology works as a legitimisation factor of the monarchy. According
to Leo Rose, the main reason explaining why Bhutan does not follow
Huntington's model which provides evidences that "the struggle
between a pro-status quo traditional elite and a pro-change
modernising elite is likely to be fatal to any monarchical system
lacking the western European political-cultural background",51 is the
absence of a "strong traditional elite bitterly opposed to programs of
change". We propose to add a second factor: the promotion of Gross
National Happiness as a cohesive national ideology, which works as a
strong support for the regime.
Political Patterns
Political patterns refer to the question of the decision-making process:
Who takes the decisions in the Bhutanese political system? What has
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been done to enlarge the process in order to imply greater
participation of the people? To what extent does this process give
indications regarding the general attitude towards modernisation?
The first question deals with the structure, the role and the status of
the ruling elite. Traditional elite families, who had a long history of
influence in local politics prior to 1907, contributed to the assertion of
the monarchy. Family ties, economic possessions, and ancestry
lineage have been decisive in drawing the main circles of power
around the king. Merit has been equally important in shaping the
modern elite. In the absence of political parties, and because the
political status of monks has been eroded and the influence of Chimis
mainly operates in their constituency, only the royal family and the
bureaucracy qualify as active members of the ruling elite. Although
the king is the centre of the polity, his immediate entourage is less
present in everyday politics than it used to be thirty years ago. Some
ministers have family links with the monarch, through marriage
alliances, but members of the royal family are not given ministerial
status "either directly or in slightly disguised forms"52 as it was the
case during the 70's. They have been confined in protocolar,
humanitarian or cultural functions.53 More significantly, the
administrative power has been transferred from the Palace Secretariat
to the bureaucracy.
The bureaucracy has become both the instrument of the monarchy in
the development process and the incubator of the modern elite. It has
been opened to a wide range of people from various social and ethnic
backgrounds. The promotion through education of common people
who can access to ministerial positions, had a double impact: first it
provided Bhutan with a high qualified and experienced bureaucracy -
while the old elite was mainly socialised in the traditional culture, a
growing number of young Bhutanese has been exposed to foreign
education54- second, it allowed the monarchy to keep control on the
elite reproduction system, in order to stay the primary agent of
modernisation, and to enlarge its support base. A great attention has
been given to the modernisation of the bureaucracy itself55: foreign
administrators and technicians have been progressively replaced by
well trained Bhutanese personnel, new structures have been created,
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co-ordination between departments has been improved, lines of
responsibility have been defined, ministerial authority has been
asserted. The devolution of full executive powers of governance to an
elected cabinet, was a logical step in that process. While it is
uncommon in most South Asian states, for bureaucrats to be
appointed to ministerial positions, what has become a general practice
in Bhutan since the 1960's, has been somehow institutionalised in
1998. As stated by the king56, candidates for ministerial positions
"should be selected from among persons who have held senior
government posts at the rank of Secretary to the Royal Government or
above". Such a mechanism excludes, at least for the moment, non
bureaucrat candidates. Although the merit-based selection
theoretically57 allows a very wide accession to the elite status, the
system narrows while in function. Recently, the Royal Government
has confirmed its commitment to review, rationalise and strengthen
the bureaucracy. Promoting efficiency, transparency, and
accountability within the administration, has become a key element
for enhancing good governance.58
Assuming that consensus politics in a traditional society like Bhutan
are largely elite-dominated, the scope of genuine popular participation
in the decision-making process was relatively narrow until the 1960's.
Because the modern elite system itself was highly centralised, the
question of power sharing and participation in the decision-making
process had to be addressed. Significant efforts have been made to
create institutional mechanisms capable, at least in theory, to enlarge
the system of power allocation, and to promote a grass-root
participatory polity.
At the national level, although the Tshogdu is still far from a western
parliament, its powers have been regularly increased, since its creation
in 1953. It has gained authority in the legislative sphere that
progressively superseded its function as a consultative body59. The
recent decision to reintroduce the vote of confidence in the king,
although symbolical, enhances the authority of the National Assembly
as a representative of the people. During the last decade, matters of
national importance have been regularly raised by Chimis who have
specific concerns regarding security matters, and preservation of the
Bhutanese heritage. On various occasions, they have expressed views
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that differ significantly from those defended by the king and the Royal
Government. Debates are open to critics and propositions. Discussions
on the annual budget are becoming more and more incisive. While the
king still appoints ministers, the National Assembly has been assigned
the role not only to approve appointments or removals as it was the
case until 1998, but also to elect ministers. The system is yet too
recent to know if the National Assembly will gain a real control over
the selection, Designation and revocation of top executive officers.
However, this parliamentary-like evolution could result in significant
changes in Bhutanese politics where personal destinies have been
exclusively promoted by the Palace. In the absence of factional
alignments or political associations, the emergence of a stable support
base within the Assembly for long term programs and policies, is not
clear. Moreover, "under the Tshogdu's haphazard electoral system,
there is limited continuity of membership, and only a small proportion
of the people's representatives in the Assembly have had a lengthy
experience in government".60 For these reasons, representatives of the
people are not ready to challenge the bureaucracy's elite position. The
Tshogdu has not yet become a channel for advancement of the people
who dominate the decision-making process.
At the local level, the creation of block (GYT) and district (DYT)
development committees has been a significant institutional
innovation.61 Basically, these elected bodies,62 that are scattered all
around the country, have been created to co-ordinate development
activities. Used by their members as forums to articulate local needs
and grievance, they fully participate to the legislative process. Points
submitted to the National Assembly have first to be ratified by GYT
and DYT, and genuine decentralisation is progressively taking roots.
Although considerable efforts have been made to involve local
communities in the decision making process, differences existing in
Bhutan like in all developing countries, between rural and urban
populations, educated and uneducated people, is still one of the major
lines dividing the society and polity. The political consciousness of
the Chimis and the members of the local committees is progressively
increasing. Yet, they are essentially interested in local issues. For that
reason, conservatism is still dominant among their circles.63
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The Challenges Ahead
As many changes have already occurred during the past three decades,
the Bhutanese polity will be confronted to various challenges relating
to the nation, the economy and the people.
The Nation
As noted in a Vision Statement prepared by the Royal Government: "
The main challenge facing the nation as a whole is the maintenance of
our identity, sovereignty and security as a nation-state".64 In that
context, the Bhutanese nation is facing two major threats, internal, and
external. In both cases communalism tensions are playing a major
role.
Although the Northern Bhutanese culture associated with the Drukpa
tradition prevails, the kingdom is multi-ethnic, multi-religion, and
multi-lingual. In such a country, modernisation, which is inseparable
from the nation-building process, needs national integration. In order
to achieve that goal, which has been described by the Druk Gyalpo
under the concept of "one people, one nation", unification of political
decision is needed in order to create conditions for "modernising the
minds of the people" and to lead them "into a post-ethnic
consciousness".65 The major risk comes from ethnic tensions which
can contradict the overall process. National integration was generally
considered a success in Bhutan where all minorities could enjoy their
own culture within the mainstream of the Bhutanese society. During
the 1980's, sections of the Lhotshampa (Nepali) minority started to
consider that integration was detrimental to their identity and that
homogenisation resulting from modernisation was leading to the
exclusive domination of the Drukpa culture. The declaration of
Dzongkha as the only national language, the termination of the
teaching of Nepali in schools, the promulgation of a code of etiquette
(Driglam Namzha), and the identification of illegal immigrants
through census operations were assimilated to a "Bhutanisation"
process whose only purpose was to favour the culturally and
politically dominant group. This perception has been amplified by the
difference existing between Lhotshampa and other ethnic
communities in term of political consciousness. While politicisation
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of the Drukpa society has always been very low, people of Nepali
origin have been exposed to politics at least from the beginning of the
1950's, when the roots of ethnic dissent in Bhutan can be traced. The
creation in 1952 of the Bhutan State Congress (BSC), was the first
attempt of the people of Nepali origin to organise themselves. It failed
because it was unable to expand its socio-political base to include
people from ethnic groups other than Nepalis, and to engender a
broad-based support among the Nepali Bhutanese community itself.66
Yet political developments in Sikkim during the early 1970's, the
permanence of Gorkha militancy in the Darjeeling Hills during the
early 1980's and political upheavals in Nepal in 1989-90, contributed
to a greater politicisation of the people of Nepali origin and to the
exacerbation of the crisis that led to the departure of thousands of
people from the southern districts of Bhutan to refugees camp in
eastern Nepal. Although the problem in Southern Bhutan had been
largely mitigated, the presence of a large minority which is the most
recognisably disenfranchised under the hereditary monarchy 67 is still
a challenge to the political order. Should the Royal Government
accept the return of some of the people who currently live in Nepal,
there is no guarantee that this population which has been influenced
by Nepalese politics during the last decade, will easily reintegrate the
Bhutanese "melting-pot". Solution will have to be found to prevent
any ethnic confrontation that could be fatal to consensus politics.
Such a threat should be taken seriously as the kingdom is located in a
region submitted to potentially disruptive changes. ULFA and Bodos
militants who are rebelling against the Indian Government have
established their presence in the border areas in the eastern districts.
Their presence is a direct threat to Bhutan's sovereignty and security.
It has already created serious problems for the commercial activities
of the business sector and has been affecting the implementation of
development programmes. The concern of the local population led
Chimis to claim for rapid and concrete solution, during the last session
of the National. The king has taken full responsibility for resolving the
problem. A dialogue has been initiated with the ULFA, and measures
have been taken in order to cut off all supplies to the camps of the
militants. Should a peaceful solution not be found, the implications of
a military option are uncertain. Some Bhutanese have been reported to
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support the unrest. Although limited to fractional elements, such
behaviours are disruptive factors in Bhutanese politics.
The People
Because solidarity has always been strong in local communities,
social categorisation as applied in the West, was not relevant to
describe the traditional rural Bhutanese society. The situation is
changing with modernisation. The fault lines found in all developing
countries - between rural and urban societies, have and have not, the
younger and older generations, men and women - are likely to develop
in Bhutan too. Population growth, urbanisation and tertiarization of
the economy have brought many changes. Individual behaviours have
already been affected. New trends have emerged with either good or
negative impact on the overall society. After completing their
education abroad, young Bhutanese have seeded a life style steeped in
consumerism and western values. Bars and video-shops have been
mushrooming in urban areas. Although not yet alarming, the cases of
drug abuse and thefts and the crime rate are on the rise. New criminal
activities, like the desecration of Chörten with the intention of
smuggling religious antiques enshrined in them, is a direct challenge
to traditional values. The influence of religion has been eroded,
especially among the younger generations. Intra-family solidarity is
declining between urban and rural communities. In some cases
traditional values have adapted quite well to foreign trends, in some
other cases they have suffered from modernisation.68
 As noted by a
Chimi during the 77th session of the National Assembly: "in a town
like Thimphu where there is a congregation of all kinds of people, it is
difficult to ensure that the Driglam Namzha and dress code are
observed properly". Although considerable efforts have been done to
increase understanding and knowledge of the people on the dress
code, it will become more and more difficult in the long run for the
younger generation to resist the attraction of western fashion, and for
the government to enforce its policy. Due to the inconvenience at
work of the traditional dressing, accommodations have already been
accepted for certain professions and others are under consideration.69
As far as collective behaviours are concerned, the most significant
evolution during the past three decades, has been the emergence of a
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middle-class, whose growth will have a decisive impact on the
traditional society and polity. New social needs have emerged.
Although most of them have not yet been translated into political
requirements, the time will come when further reforms are needed. In
some cases traditional institutions have already started to adapt. The
emergence of feminism is a good example. While women have
traditionally been vested with the responsibilities of running the
households, their political role has always been minor. Things are
progressively changing as women are claiming equality with men.
Now "in the zomdus in the villages and in geog meetings, women are
the main participants".70 They have been elected as people's
representatives to the National Assembly71 but there are no women in
ministerial positions although boys and girls have equal access to
higher education. Among the decisions taken to commemorate the
Silver Jubilee anniversary of the king's coronation in June 1999, the
introduction of the internet and television has been the most
significant in term of adaptation of the traditional society to the
modern world. However, a society with a strong oral tradition like
Bhutan is very vulnerable to the negative influences of the media, as
shown by the debate which has appeared in the country about the risks
of external influences diluting the kingdom's cultural heritage and
religious values.
Political consciousness is increasing among the average Bhutanese.
As observed in other developing countries, the development of
concepts like consumer rights which are progressively gaining ground
in Bhutan,72 could lead to further changes through lobbying and
political mobilisation. As already noted: "the government has not
formally banned political parties, but it is well understood by the
Bhutanese elite that the formation of such organisations at this time is
still discouraged. The day will probably come when political parties
will not only be permitted but will indeed be an essential ingredient in
a liberalised, participatory political system".73 Under the current
context the main risk would be to let divisive forces of communalism
interfere with that process. The legalisation of ethnic based political
movement alone would probably be fatal to the culture of consensus.74
For that reason, the local polity will have to find fault lines adapted to
its nature. The opposition between progressives and conservatives,
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which is already existing though it has not generated definitive
political tensions, could draw these lines.75 The major challenge for
the regime will be to allow this confrontation to happen in other
occasions than the annual session of the National Assembly or the
meetings of the local committees in a form that does not contradict
consensus politics.
The Economy
Despite the progress already recorded, the Bhutanese economy is still
in its infancy. As noted in a government report, "it is not yet fully
monetized and the nation's economic structure is still shallow and
narrow",76 with the main impulse coming from the state whose
paternalistic approach has been the driving force behind the country's
economic development. In that context private sector development is
both an economic necessity and a political challenge.
Since the implementation of the Sixth five-year Plan, the Royal
Government has declared that "the private sector should play an
increasingly important role in fostering economic growth and as a
source of employment". Privatisation is already underway and
redefining the role of the state is under consideration. As Bhutan
moves forward to adapt its economic structure to international
competition77 and promote economic growth and stability through
liberalisation of its structures, new actors are joining the scene.
Although the private sector is still at an early stage of development
and is not yet well organised, entrepreneurs are forming a new
category in the society whose role will be decisive in the coming
years. The Government has already called for the private sector to
take a greater share in the development process. The implementation
of that policy will need careful monitoring. While the State will
progressively move from a role of "provider" to the status of "enabler"
of development, the question of power sharing between government,
private sector, and NGOs will become more and more accurate.
As listed by Stefan Priesner,78 they are obvious contradictions
between market economy and Gross National Happiness. First "the
current role of the state contradicts a flourishing private sector. Rather
than a paternalistic state, which directly interferes in all parts of
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development, private sector development calls for retreat of the state
to the position of a monitoring agent backed by a transparent legal
framework. Second, to promote private business effectively, the
government is compelled to restructure its development priorities
towards an increased centrality of economic concerns. Third, private
sector development requires a reorientation of people's attitudes
towards saving, consumption, work, time, and profit from traditional
values to the rules of the market. Notwithstanding the state's capacity
to correct market failures, these structural pressures will possibly
jeopardise the non-economic objectives of Bhutanese development
such as cultural and environmental preservation". Fourth, as the
rapidly growing educated work force will be derived from the public
sector to the private sector, the monopoly of the bureaucracy as the
ruling elite will have to be reconsidered.
Conclusion
The Bhutanese polity evolved from a unique historical background of
the pre-1907 period. First, it was demonstrated that it was the product
of a deeply imprinted sense of cultural identity which had generated
the dominating paradigm of "survival and preservation". The tradition
of consensus has been described as the mere prolongation of   the
concept of "unitary dualisms" inherited from Buddhist values, and
incarnated by the hereditary monarchy. Second, it was argued that the
hereditary monarchy was the major link between Bhutan's past and
present. Its capacity to incarnate both tradition and modernity has
given it a leading role in the defining of a national ideology, known as
"Gross National Happiness" which is both a unique approach to socio-
economic development and a legitimisation factor of the current
polity. The cultural influence of religion on politics and the leading
role of the bureaucracy have been described as decisive and
sometimes contradictory factors of the general attitude towards
political modernisation. Finally, it was suggested that Bhutan was
facing major challenges that needed further adaptation of its polity in
order to maintain the pace of "change in continuity".
Bhutan is under a growing pressure both in terms of cultural
preservation and socio-economic development. Because containing
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negative outside influences is more and more difficult, conciliating
tradition and modernity will become even harder. There is a strong
feeling in the kingdom that national values will eventually mitigate
negative external factors. Even in that case, adjustments will be
needed in order to preserve consensus politics. Viewed from a western
perspective of political development, Bhutan is at a cross-roads. The
king's objective to "promote even greater people's participation in the
decision making process" is indeed essential to the viability of the
"Bhutanese exception".79 Apart from decisive institutional reforms
which have already been engaged, the implication of the whole
society is needed. Because promoting is better than preserving,
Bhutan will probably have to reassess the way "national culture" is
perceived by young generation and non-Buddhist communities.
Enhancing the emphasis on traditional values in the education system
and fostering the ancient dialogue between Buddhism and Hinduism
will certainly contribute to the dynamisation of "cultural identity"
which otherwise might be perceived as a purely rhetoric and
restrictive concept.  Inventing new consultation mechanisms which
are both compatible with consensus politics and the promotion of a
grass-root participatory polity will also be useful. The introduction in
the Bhutanese polity of non plebiscitary referenda based on people
initiative, comparable to the systems existing in Switzerland or Italy
could be an interesting perspective for the monarchy to consider.80
Eventually, assimilating in the ruling elite newly mobilised and
potentially politically participant groups coming from the private
sector and other non governmental circles, will help Bhutan enlarge
the support base of its unique approach to development.
Dzongkha Transcription - Transliteration Table and Glossary
Bhutanese terms are followed by brackets containing their
transliterated spelling according to the Wylie System
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Chathrim (bca' khrims): Rules and regulations
Chimi (sPyi mi): Member of the National Assembly (People's
representative)
Chögyal (chos rgyal): the head of the civil structure who is also the
protector and the promoter of the dharma, in the Himalayan tradition
Chöje (Chos-rje): "Lord of Religion". Ancient title used by the heads
of noble families.
Chhösi (chos srid): Dual System of Government (temporal and
religious) that prevailed in Bhutan from 1650 to 1907.
Chörten (mchod rten): Stupa, Buddhist monument
Dorje Lopon (rDo rje slob dpon): The Second in command in the
Drukpa religious hierarchy
Dragpo tewa (drag-po'i lte-ba): Literally "the centre of violence"
Dratshang (Grva tshang): State monastic community
Dratshang Lhentshog (Grva tshang lHen Tshogs): Council of
ecclesiastic affairs
Driglam Namzha (sGrigs lam rnam gzhag): Code of etiquette
Druk Desi ('Brug sde srid): The "Regent of Drukyul". The head
administrative officer under the Zhabdrung system (1650-1907).
Called Deb Raja in most Western-language sources.
Druk Gyalpo ('Brug rgyal po): The King of Bhutan. Title given to the
Wangchuk monarchs since 1907.
Druk Gyalpo Nadag Rinpoche (Bru rgyal-po mnga'-bdag rin-po-che):
The "Precious Master of Power and King of Drukyul". Ceremonial
term referring to the King of Bhutan
Drukpa ('Brug pa): Followers of the religious school of the Drukpa
Kagyu
Drukpa Kagyu ('Brug pa bka' brgyud): A branch of Tantric Lamaïsm
originated from Naropanchen. The official religion of Bhutan
Drukyul ('Brug yul): Literally "Land of the Dragon", name of Bhutan
in Bhutanese
Dzong (rDzong): Fort-monastery
Dzongkha (rDzong kha): Language of western Bhutan, now t h e
national language
Dzongkhag (rDzong khag): District (20 districts in Bhutan)
Dzongkhag Yargay Tschochung (DYT) (rDzong khag yar rgyas
tshogs chung): District Development Committee
Gakid (dga' skyid): Literally " happiness and peace"
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Genja (Gan rgya): Contractual document
Geog (rGed'og): Administrative unit under a district. Block
Geog Yargay Tschochung (GYT) (rGed'og yar rgyas tshogs chung):
Block Development Committee
Gup (rGed po): Elected leader of a block
Jabmi (rGyab mi): Legal representative
Je Khenpo (rJe mkhan po): Spiritual head of the Drukpa Kagyu
religious school
Kidu (sKyid sdug): Welfare System
Kudungs (sKu gdung): Sacred relics (mummified remains of a high
Lama).
Kuensel: The National Paper of Bhutan: a weekly publication in
English, Dzongkha and Nepali.
Lhachhoe Gewa Chu (lHa chos dge ba bcu): Literally "the ten virtues"
Lhengye Nyamdrel Tshogchung (lHen rgyas nyams grel tshogs
chung): Co-ordination Committee of the Council of Ministers
Lhengye Zhungtshog (lHen rgyas gzhung tshogs): Council of
Ministers
Lhotshampa (lHo tshams pa): Bhutanese of Nepali origin
Lhungye Tsok (lHun rgyas tshogs): Old State Council established
during the 17th century by the Zhabdrung
Lodoi Tshogde (Blo gro'i tshog sde): Royal Advisory Council
Lonchen (Blon chen): Prime Minister.
Lyonpo: Minister
Machen (Ma chen): The sacred relics of the Zhabdrung Ngawang
Namgyel
Michhoe Tsangma Chudug (Mi chos gtsang ma bcu drug): Sixteen
Act of Social Piety
Phampa Zhi (Pham pa bzhi):  Literally " the Four Renouncements"
Peljor gongphel (dPal 'byor gong 'phel): Economic development
Shab (Zhabs): Literally "In Front of the Feet"
Zhabdrung (Zhabs drung): The spiritual and temporal sovereign of
Bhutan (1650-1907). The first Zhabdrung, Ngawang Namgyel (1594-
1651), was a great Lama of the Drukpa Kagyu school who unified
Bhutan in the mid-17th century under the hegemony of his school and
gave the country its administrative system. Toward the end of his
reign, he appointed two of his followers as his chief assistants in the
religious and civil administration. The first was made Je Khenpo, and
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the second was given the title of Druk Desi. This dual system of
government was known as chhösi.
Sizhi khordey (Srid-zhil'khor-'das): The samsara and nirvana
Terton (gter ston): Treasure discoverer
Tshogdu (Tshogs 'du): National Assembly of Bhutan
Wang-lung-thri (dBang lung khrid): Ceremonies of empowerment and
textual tranmission
Zhiwey Zhung yog (Zhi-ba'i gzhung-g.yog): literally "government
servants of peace"
Zomdu ('Dzoms 'du): Public meeting. Assembly.
Zhi-drag (Zhi drag): Peace and Violence
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